This paper compares the stability of the US Dual Banking system's two bank groups, national and state banks, in light of the current financial crisis. The goal of the paper is to answer three distinct questions: first, is there a difference in the (balance sheet-) fragility between the two JEL Classification: E44, G01, G21, G28
Introduction
Bank fragility has been at the heart of the current discussion about causes and consequences of the financial crisis. Researchers and practitioners alike have always recognized the importance of a safe and sound banking system, yet the amount of failures and instabilities within the banking system remind everybody again what the systemic consequences of big and unexpected bank failures -especially in times of crisis -can be. A thorough understanding of bank fragility with its determinants and economic implications is thus of high importance, even more so in times of crisis in which sudden exogenous shocks can cause an unanticipated systemic instability. Although past research has brought forward many theoretical and empirical results which provide the basis for a fundamental understanding of banks and their proneness to instability, new times and changing economic environments also call for new analyses to gain an understanding of new crises. Consequently, academia has reacted quickly in analyzing the current crisis. First papers dealing with bank stability and the financial crisis are e.g. Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2009) , Freixas, Martin and Skeie (2009) , Wagner (2009) , Kuttner (2008) or Berger and Bouwman (2008) . Although these papers cover a large variety of important crisis-and bank-related aspects, there is one aspect which has been largely ignored in research so far: the role of regulatory and supervisory agencies for bank and bank system stability, especially in the United States where the current financial crisis originated.
These agencies play a pivotal role in keeping the banking system healthy by not only constantly monitoring and preventing banks from conducting business which might endanger their stability but also by deciding on the survival of distressed banks and taking failed banks safely out of business. In the US the major supervisory agencies are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve (Fed) as well as local state supervisory authorities. These agencies have the regulatory and supervisory power over almost 95% of all US commercial banks. The OCC has authority over all national banks and bank holding companies. State banks, both member and non-member banks of the Federal Reserve System, are jointly supervised by the FDIC, the Fed and state supervisors. All agencies monitor banks by regularly examining the banks' operating business in terms of risk with special regard to "safety and soundness and consumer protection"
1 . As system stability and individual banks' fragility are direct consequences of how safe and sound the respective supervisory agency wants to keep "its" bank, the paper will 1 Quote taken from www.fdic.gov -Mission, Vision and Values distinguish between state and national banks when performing stability analyses. The first major research questions of this paper is thus: to what extent does the (balance sheet-) fragility of the two banking groups change after the escalation of the current crisis in the August of 2007?
A second aspect which has only been largely ignored in current and past crisis-related literature is the liquidity creation of banks and to what degree it can increase banks' proneness to instability. Especially in the current crisis, the liquidity aspect of banks has been a major factor: what is now known to be a "liquidity crunch" has contributed significantly to not only the escalation of the crisis but also to the magnitude and number of bank failures. Why is liquidity creation so pivotal for banks and their stability? The reason is the liquidity mismatch between assets and liabilities as a result of maturity transformation processes by which the bank creates liquidity. Banks offer depositors short-term availability of deposited money and grant borrowers long-term availability of loan money. By transforming maturities of shortterm liabilities (i.e. deposits) into long-term assets (i.e. loans), banks hold illiquid items instead of the general public and are able to offer liquidity to both depositors and borrowers.
Instability arises in times of heightened deposit demand or increased loan charge-offs.
Whenever banks cannot meet the liquidity demand on the liabilities side of the balance sheet, e.g. in case of a bank run, they become illiquid and run the risk of being taken out of business by the respective supervisory agency. The fact that most bank failures during the current crisis as well as the instabilities of system relevant banks are a direct consequence of liquidity problems calls for a new and thorough analysis of bank liquidity creation and its influence on bank stability. Although the theoretical idea of banks as liquidity creators was already developed by Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) back in the 1980s and had also already been used for empirical research by Deep and Schaefer (2004) and Bouwman (2007, 2008) , there are to the best of my knowledge only two papers covering liquidity aspects in the current crisis : Freixas, Martin and Skeie (2009) and . By adding to this body of literature, this paper tries to fill that void. The second major research question of this paper is thus: to what extent do the two banking groups differ in their liquidity creation and to what extent does that liquidity creation contribute to the banks' fragility?
The paper measures bank fragility using four CAMEL indicators as well as four liquidity indicators. CAMEL scores are balance sheet-based ratios or figures indicating the stability of banks; they have long been used by regulators and supervisors around the world. The liquidity indicators are newly developed techniques by Deep and Schaefer (2004) and Berger and Bouwman (2008) which allow detailed analysis of total and relative liquidity amounts per bank as well as the extent of liquidity mismatch on the balance sheet. The differences in fragility between the groups and the changes in fragility from before to after the beginning of the current crisis are measured with a univariate and multivariate difference-in-difference methodology.
By tackling these research questions, the paper addresses two topics. First, the paper aims at providing evidence on the stability of the US banking system before and during the beginnings of the current financial crisis. This insight allows for a thorough analysis of how stable US banks are in times of regular economic conditions and how the current crisis changed this stability for better or for worse. Second, the paper will distinguish between the safety and soundness of the two banking groups in the US, state and national banks. The results will thus allow for a comparative analysis of the way authorities conduct bank supervision. This comparison also has a political dimension. For years, there has been an ongoing debate about the benefits and concerns about the duality of the US banking system (see e.g. Robertson, 1966; Kreps, 1966; Scott, 1977 or, more recently, Blair and Kushmeider, 2006, Telser, 2007) . Although there are many arguments in favor of the system, there are also many critics asking for changes in the system or abandoning the system altogether. The results of this study can serve as arguments in this debate by answering the question of whether or not one part of the system might be more stable than the other part. More importantly, the analyses of the paper also address a most recent political debate on the restructuring of the banking system as a consequence of the current financial crisis. The paper is structured as follows: section 2 discusses the theoretical background on the concept of bank liquidity creation in order to cover the most important subject of this paper.
The third part will explain the way bank fragility is measured for the analyses at hand as well as the univariate and multivariate difference-in-difference analysis. The fourth part will discuss the results of the different analyses. The fifth part will elaborate on two robustness tests which are performed to validate the results of the paper's main analyses. The sixth part will summarize the results and interpret them. supervisors, depending on which group they belong to as described above. The stark difference here is that national banks are only supervised by the OCC, whereas state banks are not supervised by the OCC at all but instead by the FDIC, Fed and state supervisors.
Bank supervision in the US
What types of risks the agencies look for or when risky operations become intolerable for the supervisor is a very opaque process. All supervisors are not very transparent in the way they disclose safety and soundness standards for banks and the way they are enforced. A source of rules and standards are FDIC and OCC supervision handbooks. Both of these manuals contain detailed information about the stability-relevant areas of banks such as capital, liquidity, market risk exposure or earnings. For all these areas, the manuals describe on which factors a supervisor will focus on and in which way she will evaluate these factors. The factors both agencies rely on are CAMEL scores, as represented by capitalization, management efficiency/quality and liquidity. Using a number of balance sheet and P&L proxies, a final score is derived for each bank which indicates the bank's safety and soundness. In order to evaluate banks the same way as supervisors do, I also look at the banks' CAMEL factors for the paper's analyses. However in spite of a large amount of "soft" information, these manuals do not contain any "hard" information such as target ratios for certain risk relevant assets or liabilities. The only exception is made for capital: both manuals include the standard Basel numbers for capital calculation and required magnitude of capitalization. As much relevant "hard" information is not disclosed, it is thus very difficult to tell when a supervisor will deem a bank in danger of distress. Additionally, examination reports are not made public. Drawing on past bank examinations to derive possible distress thresholds is hence not possible. The official term used in supervision legislation is the "safety and soundness" of a bank: whenever a supervisor regards a bank as "unsafe and unsound" she is allowed to take action against the bank. Again, the term "unsafe and unsound" is not defined by any "hard" numbers, i.e. there is no list of ratios providing thresholds a bank must not fail. For determining the safety and soundness, a supervisor (or a court) will look at a bank's resilience and whether or not it is "robust in its operations". Speaking in very simple terms, this means to which degree a bank is likely to go into illiquidity or insolvency within a given amount of time without the help of third parties. The likelihood of distress and the loss given default, i.e. the size of bank, are also the crucial factors in determining the action taken to either keep the bank in business or take the bank safely out of business. For doing so, the supervisors have a variety of possibilities. They can informally or formally advise the bank's management of possible unsafe or unsound operations and leave the resolving of the issues to the bank. They also have the power to force mandatory precautionary or corrective measures upon the bank if they believe that management is either incapable or unwilling to take the necessary steps needed to restore the safety and soundness of the bank. Next to these informal or formal measures -which are mostly used -the authorities can also fine the bank for not implementing informal or formal advice of the supervisors. In tougher cases, supervisors are empowered to issue
Cease and Desist orders against the bank and/or its managers to force the bank into complying with the authority. To take a bank out of business without the bank's management approval, both agencies can retrieve the bank charters and therefore end the operations of the bank. All these measures show that the agencies can take any action necessary to influence the operating business of the bank in order to keep the banks safe and sound. In most cases, the supervisors work together with the banks on a so called "control as influence" basis, meaning that the supervisors are in constant dialogue with the bank, its risk, legal and compliance departments and management and give recommendations which the bank follows. The harsher "control as command" basis as represented by cease and desist orders or charter retrieval comes into play whenever there is serious misconduct by the bank or the immediate threat of financial distress.
The way in which supervisors monitor banks clearly shows the large influence that supervisors have on the day-to-day operations of a bank and hence on its safety and soundness. They also show that supervisors can not only exert corrective but also precautionary measures to keep banks stable, for example in anticipation of times of economic turmoil. Yet, there is no possibility to determine any differences in the way supervision is conducted or how the different agencies deal with crisis situations or financial distress of banks.
Methodology and data

Measuring bank fragility
The paper applies two proxies to measure bank stability, both related to the fragility of individual banks' balance sheets. First, classic "CAMEL" score methodology is applied. The term "CAMEL" stands for capital adequacy, management efficiency and liquidity, as represented by the first capital letters of each term, and refers to a number of indicators which give evidence of a bank's operative strength and balance sheet stability. There are many possible ratios or figures which can indicate whether or not a bank is adequately capitalized, its management works efficiently and it is liquid enough. This analysis uses four of the most widely accepted and well known factors for capitalization and efficiency: loan loss coverage, return on assets, loan growth and cost efficiency. The paper thereby closely follows the methodology as proposed by Bongini, Claessens and Ferri (1999) and Bongini, Laeven and Majnoni (2002) . As liquidity indicators, the paper uses two newly proposed indicators by Deep and Schaefer (2004) and , as explained in more detail further below.
Loan loss coverage is measured by the ratio of excess loan loss reserves and capital (as in
Tier-1 and Tier-2 capital) to total loans. It measures to which degree a bank covers its total loans to meet sudden loan defaults. The higher the ratio, the more loans are covered by capital and the more stable is the bank. Cost efficiency is measured by the ratio of operating expenses to total revenues. The higher the ratio, the more inefficient is the bank. This inefficiency is seen as an indicator for instability because it reduces a bank's profits and thus makes it more prone to sudden exogenous shocks which affect their operating business. The general economic health of a bank is measured by the annualized loan growth. Although an increasing loan growth ratio can be positive for the general economy, it is widely perceived in a negative way in terms of bank stability. By expanding the loan volume, banks are regarded to accept loan applications from less credit-worthy borrowers. This increases the overall default risk of the loan portfolio and thus makes banks more fragile. Finally, the return on assets is calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets. It measures the profitability of each dollar in assets. Banks which "operate" their assets in a more profitable way and hence show a higher margin, are regarded as more stable. The reasoning is the same as for the cost efficiency ratio. The CAT methodology is based on a three step procedure. The first step of the procedure determines which balance sheet item is liquid or illiquid. This is done by categorizing each items based on the ease, cost and time at which the respective item can be liquidated, i.e.
turned into cash. The perspective is thereby always from the owner of the balance sheet item.
For loans, the ease, cost and time reference is seen from the bank's perspective. The easier and less costly it is to sell off a loan or the quicker it is repaid, the more liquid the loan is. The same logic applies for all assets: consequently, the most liquid asset is cash. For the liabilities, the ease, cost and time applies for the depositors. Following the asset labeling, the most liquid liability is a checkings account which can be demanded on a daily basis. In contrast, a savings account with a maturity of 5 years would be labeled illiquid as it could only be withdrawn after five years. In the second step of the procedure each asset is weighted positive or negative according to its label. For liquid assets and illiquid liabilities, the label is negative, whereas for illiquid assets and liquid liabilities the label is positive. The weights are either +0.5 or -0.5, in order to calculate one US Dollar of liquidity for each liquid liability which is turned into and illiquid asset. The third label, semi-liquid, is weighted with 0. Berger and Bouwman do this for all balance sheet items which cannot clearly be determined as being either liquid or illiquid. As those would blur the final result, they are taken out of the calculation. The last It is to be noted that there are further distress or fragility indicators for banks, some also focusing on efficiency or capitalization factors, others focusing on different aspects such as asset price-or debt-related factors. Most prominent factors are the "Distance to Default" and the "Subordinated Debt Spread", as explained by e.g. Vulpes (2002 and . 4 Both factors can give short-term indications of the level of distress of a bank and are widely used by regulatory and supervisory agencies. However, we forego an inclusion of these factors for two reasons. First, to observe all national and state banks and to avoid a sample selection bias, we observe both stock-listed and non-stock listed banks. The two mentioned factors can only deliver useful results for stock-listed banks due to their strong focus on market prices for assets and liabilities. Second, both factors do not take bank liquidity into account, which is at the focus of this paper's analysis.
Univariate and multivariate fragility analyses
To find answers to the paper's research questions, the analysis follows a simple and clear-cut two step procedure. The first step contains a detailed analysis of the actual crisis-related comparison of both banking groups' fragility. I therefore apply a difference-in-difference methodology which allows for a comparison of both banking groups before the beginning of the crisis, after the beginning of the crisis and a comparison of the changes in the differences among the groups from before to after the beginning of the crisis. A difference-in-difference analysis can be applied whenever differences between two groups are to be measured, before one of the groups has undergone a certain kind of treatment or change and after this treatment or change has affected the group. The methodology was made popular by Card and Krueger (1994) and has since been a widely-accepted and well-known methodology to measure differences between so called "treatment" and "control" groups before and after a treatment.
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The treatment group is the state-banking group, the control group is the national-banking unclear whether or not any supervisory authority has exerted any "treatment" on banks and, if so, when this "treatment" has happened. However, these obstacles and the arbitrary choice for treatment group and period should not pose a problem for the analysis at hand: the goal of this paper is to detect possible differences in the fragility of the observed banking groups prior to and after the beginning of the current financial crisis. I thus apply the difference-in-difference
analysis not to detect a certain treatment but to detect these differences between the banking groups. As can be seen in part 6 of the paper, a robustness test is applied to account for the choice of the treatment group and the observed time frame.
The difference-in-difference analysis is not only applied for descriptive comparisons of the two groups, but also in a multivariate regression setting. A specific goal of this paper is to determine whether or not the regulatory and supervisory agencies are responsible for possible differences and changes in differences between the two groups. Yet, a large number of factors might be responsible for changes in fragility after the beginning of the crisis apart from the supervisory agencies. To only observe the absolute and relative changes between the groups might explain how the groups differ but not why. I apply a multivariate regression setting including a difference-in-difference estimator to determine to what extent the supervisory agency is responsible for the observed changes, thereby controlling for other possible influence factors. The estimated model is
The dependent variable ܻ ,௧ is the respective CAMEL score or liquidity indicator, varying between the banks and over time. Used dependent variables are the four "classic" CAMEL indicators return on assets, loan growth, cost efficiency and loan loss coverage as well as the four liquidity indicators total liquidity, total liquidity including off balance sheet items, LT Gap and ratio of total liquidity to total assets. ‫ܣ‬ ௧ represents time dummy variables to capture possible trend effects, ‫ܤ‬ ,௧ are bank-specific control variables to account for heterogeneity among the banks. Included are the ratio of agricultural loans to total loans, total assets, total equity, the ratio of private to institutional loans, the ratio of trading assets to total assets, the ratio of short-term to long-term deposits, the loan charge offs and the net income. These variables control for the business model of the bank (private versus institutional clients, rural focus and investment focus), the size of the bank (total assets) and the operative strength of the bank (net income). ‫ܥ‬ ௧ contains macroeconomic control variables which might affect all banks to a similar degree. These factors have to be included in order to differentiate the effect of the supervisory agency from other influence factors, especially since some fragility One thing should be stressed at this point: although the inclusion of fixed effects accounts for bank specific differences in the sample, I use the mentioned bank characteristic variables as well as macroeconomic control variables to distinguish between "supply and demand" effects of bank fragility. Liquidity creation is not only the result of active banking policy, it can also be driven by the availability of deposits or the demand for loans. Interest rate spreads also play a major role, not only due to profitability reasons but also because they influence loan demand, especially for long-versus short-term loans. The analysis wants to determine whether or not changes in fragility -mainly represented by liquidity factors -are driven by active policy management of banks' supervisory agencies. The control variables control for these influence factors. The yielded estimators for the difference-in-differences estimators are thus able to only reflect the influences of the supervisory agencies and the crisis.
To run the regression, I use a dynamic-panel difference GMM estimation model with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and the inclusion of lags of the dependent variable as explanatory variable to account for autoregressive effects. 6 This estimation technique is chosen due to the specifics of the dataset. First, the regressors might not be fully exogenous and correlate with current and past realizations of the error. I regress bank balance sheet variables on other bank balance sheet variables, possible endogeneity of the variables is thus to be expected. To account for that, the lags of the regressors serve as instrumental variables which are used for the estimation. I furthermore test on a dependent variable which is expected to depend on its past realizations, thus being dynamic. In case the supervisory agency might pursue boundaries for certain fragility indicators and hence adjusts these indicators accordingly, the analysis can account for that. Third, I include unobserved fixed effects for which this estimation technique accounts. As we apply a panel dataset we expect panel-typical heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within the individuals. This estimation methodology thus allows for an unbiased estimation of the regression and yields reliable results.
Data
The analyses in this paper are performed with US Call Report data. The data set contains full balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, all off-balance sheet items as well as excerpts on risk 
Descriptive results and univariate difference-in-difference analysis
In the first step of the analysis, the paper provides a broad overview of the actual ratios and figures for the four classic CAMEL as well as the newly introduced four liquidity factors for both banking groups. Starting with the classic CAMEL factors of loan growth, loan loss coverage, cost efficiency and return on assets, the paper does not detect any strong visible effects of the crisis on the banks, neither in terms of anticipation nor in terms of reaction after the escalation of the crisis in August 2007. As can be seen in (table 7) . The first thing to note about the liquidity-to-asset ratio is that state banks have on average higher ratios than national banks. This means that state banks create more liquidity relative to their asset size, which is especially interesting since national banks create more overall total liquidity than state banks. Furthermore, the numbers show an increase over time for both bank groups; a reaction to the events in Q3/2007 can not be detected. What can be seen, however, is that the ratios for both groups increase strongly at the beginning of the What can be concluded from this result is that banks need less amount of maturity transformation to create larger amounts of liquidity because the liabilities-side liquidity is increased by deposit behavior of clients who tend to hold less deposits in short-term deposits.
The univariate difference-in-difference analysis for the liquidity values again supports the descriptive results, as can be seen in table 8. In the period before the crisis escalation, the analysis finds highly significant differences between the two groups for all four liquidity 
Multivariate difference-in-difference analysis results
The results of the descriptive and univariate part of the analysis can only show to what extent the two banking groups differ in the given stability factors. To determine the causes of the changes within and between the groups and to attribute the underlying reason for the change to a supervisory agency, a multivariate difference-in-difference analysis is performed. This analysis allows to disentangle market-or bank-inherent factors from supervisory influence on the banks. The three variables in questions are ‫ݏ݅ݏ݅ݎܥ‬ ௗ௨௬ , ‫ݐ݊݁݉ݐܽ݁ݎܶ‬ ௗ௨௬ , and, most importantly, the interaction term of crisis and treatment indicator ‫ݏ݅ݏ݅ݎܥ‬ ௨௬ ‫כ‬ ‫ݐ݊݁݉ݐܽ݁ݎܶ‬ ௗ௨௬ . 7 The general finding is that all three indicators support all the findings from the univariate analysis. The results show that overall and in the presence of a number of controlling factors, the differences between the groups can be attributed to the supervisory agents.
From the regressions with the four classic CAMEL score factors, only loan growth has a significant coefficient for the ‫ݏ݅ݏ݅ݎܥ‬ ௨௬ ‫כ‬ ‫ݐ݊݁݉ݐܽ݁ݎܶ‬ ௗ௨௬ interaction term variable, as can be seen in table 9 . This means that national banks -given that other possible influence factors are controlled for -reduced lending activity after the escalation of the crisis in Q3/2007 stronger than state banks did. Since the variable in question is the loan growth, the result does not mean that they cut back on total lending. They merely reduced the amount of newly lent money to borrowers stronger than state banks did. The ‫ݏ݅ݏ݅ݎܥ‬ ௗ௨௬ and ‫ݐ݊݁݉ݐܽ݁ݎܶ‬ ௗ௨௬ variables support the finding: both are significantly negative, meaning that total loan growth of both bank groups was reduced following the escalation of the crisis and that, in total, national banks had a smaller loan growth than state banks over the whole observation period. Interaction term and treatment indicator are insignificant for all other factors, which shows that the supervisory agents had no influence on the way the factors developed. In contrast, the ‫ݏ݅ݏ݅ݎܥ‬ ௗ௨௬ indicator is significant for the efficiency and return on asset factors. For the whole sample average return on asset has therefore declined over the observation period, whereas cost efficiency increased. Both developments can be seen in the descriptive data.
Looking at the liquidity factors in table 10, the analyses yield highly significant results for all four ‫ݏ݅ݏ݅ݎܥ‬ ௨௬ ‫כ‬ ‫ݐ݊݁݉ݐܽ݁ݎܶ‬ ௗ௨௬ interaction term variables. For total liquidity including off balance sheet items, the coefficient is highly significant and positive, just as for the ratio of total liquidity to assets and the LT Gap. The interpretation is therefore the same as in the univariate setting: national banks reduce their liquidity creation after the beginning of the crisis stronger than state banks. The two other dummy variables ‫ݏ݅ݏ݅ݎܥ‬ ௗ௨௬ and ‫ݐ݊݁݉ݐܽ݁ݎܶ‬ ௗ௨௬ support these findings and reflect the findings of the descriptive analysis.
The coefficients for the treatment indicator are highly significant and positive for the total liquidity including off balance sheet items as well as the LT Gap and highly significant and negative for the ratio of total liquidity to assets. The interpretation is here that national banks create on average more absolute liquidity over the whole observation period and also use more maturity transformation for doing so (as represented by the higher LT Gap). However, relative to their size they create less liquidity than state banks. The coefficients for the crisis indicator variable are highly significant and negative for LT Gap and total liquidity with offbalance sheet items and positive for the ratio of liquidity to assets. What is shown here is that all banks reduced their total liquidity creation and the amount of maturity transformation.
Liquidity without off-balance sheet items as compared to size was however increased.
It can finally be said that all regressions are statistically valid. All Arellano/Bond-tests as reported in tables 9 and 10 reject second-order autocorrelation and the reported Sargan-tests indicate that the used instruments are jointly valid for the regression framework.
Additional analyses and robustness tests
To validate the results yielded by the major analysis, different robustness tests are performed.
In a first step, a test accounts for the large heterogeneity in the dataset. By observing almost all US commercial banks, the dataset is comprised of large multinational stock-listed banks as well as small and only regionally active savings banks. The fact that both bank groups also contain very large and very small banks makes a comparison of the two groups difficult and can bias the results. Although this heterogeneity is already accounted for by including bankspecific control variables in the regression, a further check is included in a separate analysis:
by means of propensity score matching, all observed banks are clustered into subsamples to obtain three groups of mostly homogeneous state and national banks. The groups are displayed in Included are the number of deposits as size indicator, the ratio of agricultural loans to total loans to indicate whether or not the bank is located in a rural or urban area, the ratio of private to institutional loans and the ratio of short-to long-term deposits to indicate whether the bank has a stronger focus on private versus commercial business and the ratio of trading assets to total assets to indicate whether a bank has a more investment or retail driven business.
Furthermore, a dummy variable indicating whether or not each bank is part of a bank holding company structure is included. ‫ܤ‬ is another set of bank-specific control variables, containing bank fragility indicators. ߝ ௧ is the error term. The estimation is performed using figures as of the fourth quarter of 2005, i.e. at a neutral pre-crisis period. In a second step, the banks are sorted according to their propensity scores and divided into thirds. After excluding the propensity scores outside the common support region, the subsamples lie within a propensity score range between 0.05765 to 0.87525. As can be seen in Table 13 , this procedure delivers three homogenous groups of banks which are subsequently used for the same multivariate difference-in-difference analysis as given by equation (3). For reasons of brevity, the paper will forego a detailed description of all results. The important finding of the subsample difference-in-difference analysis is that they support the results of the analysis for the whole sample. Comparing various subsamples comprised of homogeneous banks, it is found that they yield the same kinds of significances and coefficients as the analysis for the whole sample. This supports the results and their interpretations of the main analysis.
8
The second robustness test is directed at validating the choice of pre-crisis and crisis-period.
A validation can be obtained by testing the difference-in-difference analysis for different time periods in which no "treatment" effect takes place. It has to be checked whether or not the difference-in-difference analysis yields significant results for periods in which no "treatment" Finally it can be said that once the crisis will be over and the whole magnitude of it can be seen, further and more detailed analyses will be able to shed more light on these paper's research questions. This study sees itself as a stepping stone for further research and encourages other researchers to build on its results and help further understand bank fragility and the role of supervisory agencies. 
Berger and Bouwman CAT methododology
The presented table shows the bank assets and liabilities of our dataset and the classification we performed. As explained, we classified the balance sheet items in accordance with the Berger and Bouwman method. However, as our data set contains more detailed information on the maturities of the single items, we classify assets and liabilities both by category and by maturity (whereas Berger and Bouwman only classify loans by maturity). The CAT and MAT listings classify the assets by category (CAT) and maturity (MAT). 
ASSETS
Deep and Schaefer LT Gap methodology
The following table and equation shows the calculation of the Liquidity Transformation (LT) Gap as proposed by Deep and Schaefer (2004) . The table contains all balance sheet items which are used for the calculation of the Liquid Assets and the Total Deposits, the equation shows how to calculate the final ratio. The yielded values all lie within a range of -1 and +1.
Liquid Assets
Sum of Cash, Balances from Depository Institutions, Government and non-Government securities, federal funds sold, acceptances of other banks and all loans with maturity of < 3 months
Total Deposits
Sum of the total amounts of savings, time and checking accounts ‫ܶܮ‬ ‫ܽܩ‬ ൌ ‫݈ܽݐܶ‪ሺ‬‬ ‫ݏݐ݅ݏ݁ܦ‬ െ ‫݀݅ݑݍ݅ܮ‬ ‫‪ሻ‬ݏݐ݁ݏݏܣ‬ ‫݈ܽݐܶ‬ ‫ݏݐ݁ݏݏܣ‬ 
CAMEL/Liquidity
Indicator Influence on
Fragility Description
Total Liquidity (+) A higher total liquidity figure indicates that a bank holds more illiquid items instead of the general public and thus provides the general public with more liquidity. The more liquidity a bank creates for the public, the higher is the illiquidity risk of a bank in case of a sudden liquidity demand by the public. Higher liquidity creation thus indicates a higher fragility and thus higher instability of a bank
Total Liquidity OBS (+)
The value for Total Liquidity OBS is calculated the same way as the Total Liquidity value, except that the liquidity created through off balance sheet items is added to the liquidity calculation. The interpretation is the same as the total liquidity value: the higher the value, the more fragile is the bank 
Return on Assets (-)
The Return on Assets figure is an indicator of the profitability of the bank. The higher the indicator, the more assets are used for profitable business. The lower the number, the less profitable is the bank and fewer assets are thus used in a profitable way. The smaller the number, the more fragile is thus the bank.
Cost Efficiency (-)
The Cost Efficiency is represented by the ratio of operating expenses to total revenues. This indicator is used to show the efficiency of management. The lower the ratio, the lower are the operating costs of the bank which indicates a higher stability.
Loan Loss Coverage (+)
The Loan Loss Coverage is the ratio of Tier-1 and -2 capital plus Excess Loan Loss Reserves to the total amount of loans. The larger the ratio is, the more stable is the bank as it can cover a large portion of potential loan losses.
Loan Growth (+)
The Loan Growth describes the quarterly growth of total loans. The larger the loan growth is, the more risky are the banks' assets. First, a larger number of loans indicates a larger number of possible loan charge-offs. Second, a larger number of loans generally indicates that the loan portfolio contains loans which are of higher risk as the bank starts to accept loans from less creditworthy borrowers.
Table 5: Description of Balance Sheet Indicators and Ratios
The following table contains descriptions of all observed and analyzed balance sheet items and ratios of the paper's analyses. All data was collected from official Call Report data between 2000 and 2008, thus all balance sheet items were directly taken from this database. The necessary ratios were calculated using these items. The coefficient of interest is the "Crisis*Treatment Dummy" interaction term, indicating the change of the treatment group compared to the control group from the pre-crisis to the crisis period. Further reported are a dummy variable for pre-crisis and crisis period ("Crisis Dummy") and a dummy indicating whether or not the bank is in the treatment or the control group, i.e. a state or national bank ("Treatment Dummy"). Bank specific and macroeconomic control variables just as bank fixed effects and year dummy variables are included in the regression (as indicated) but not reported. Values in brackets indicate p-values.
Variable Name
Dynamic panel-data estimation
Variables
Total The presented table displays the results of two probit regressions used to calculating the propensity scores. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether or not the respective bank is a state or national bank. All independent variables are either bank characteristic variables or fragility indicators. The fourth quarter of 2005 is used to calculate the propensity scores as this can be seen as the last truly "neutral" pre-crisis quarter which indicates "fair" propensity values. Reported are coefficients as well as z-Statistics with standard errors in parentheses. The first regression uses all possible influence factors, the second regression uses only the significant influence factors to calculate the final propensity scores. 
